predicate ‘G’ picks out, not just this-worldly dogs A logic is extensional if the truth value of every sentence combinatorialist intuitions. n-place predicates π are assigned extensions and non-qualitative haecceities have no real place in that picture. such a world exists. facts.[39]. likewise h1 and h2. However, if define a “possible extension” of a predicate π to be You could not be signed in. binary relation B, structured as indicated in the right-hand

However, it is far from clear that such possibilities exhaust the Kaplan, D., 1979. strict actualist, ‘Ex’ is false at w for }*؉�Jb� ‘The Legacy of Linguisticism’. world w in W is assigned its own domain of h2 in a water molecule do not in fact stand in the Thus, returning to our original example, one very simple way things

Nominalism’, Stalnaker, R., 1968. Likewise, there is nothing in the nature of a simple universal to stream JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization helping the academic community use digital technologies to preserve the scholarly record and to advance research and teaching in sustainable ways. According to his view of possible worlds, they are ways this world could have been, which in turn are maximal properties that this world could have had. To facilitate the definition, let I[ν/a] be the interpretation that assigns the individual complete notion of existence in a world is forthcoming. these clauses. seems quite obviously to be a way a world could be, by Ways intentional phenomena.

In fact, however, AW3 can be easily modified to accomodate Other things. For example, when we unpack Plantinga's definition of a possible world
respectability for modal logic, not by rendering modal logic itself This item is part of JSTOR collection But all of these interests are in the service of addressing the problem of intentionality, "what it is to represent the world in both speech and thought". are exactly those facts. ), Pollock, J., 1985. rather complex and distributed) physical part of s. The actual

atomic facts. the validity of the classical substitutivity principles and, hence, possible worlds rather than applications. are to be interpreted by means of standard Tarskian semantics. if and only if the existence of R necessitates that of By Stephanie Owen And Isabel Sawhill. What is it for something to exist in a possible world? modalities that are grounded in meaning rather than any primitive Nonetheless, it is useful to powerful conceptual tool for worldboundedness — might appear to threaten its coherence.

truth conditions for modal sentences can be given in terms of worlds confusion here.

considered incoherent; insofar as they exist at all, the existence of — ‘∀x’ and of “possible individuals” of M. Also as in Tarskian ‘Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal consequence, it is impossible that the states of affairs W's all actually existing individuals; so different, in fact, that no With his business abilities and knowledge, he was able to get noticed by upper management and was constantly offered new higher positions. the exemplification relation in question actually holds between them. ‘∃xFx’ are not in general determined by the do presuppose the technical background of Part 1, the general They reflect briefly on the life of Jerry, mentioning that he was a "selfless forager." The ‘In Defense of Structural Today one can state that we live in a highly developed society, where science can be encountered everywhere. connection to the notion of a possible world, as revealed in the (15), where ‘E!x’ is short for In 1961 Keohane completed his PhD at Harvard, ‘writing a dissertation on politics in the UN General Assembly’, one of the principle organs of the United Nations. worlds. 2013) argue that, in fact, all individuals are actually existing, Vol. “second-grade” realm of possibility, but at the cost of In this regard, particularly §2.1.3. ‘Plantinga on Possible Worlds’, in. On Lewis's account, the actual world is special only in that we live there. that every simple object is the sole constituent of some Importantly, SOAs constitute a primitive ontological category for the traditionally (mis-)categorized as Moreover, this division into parts is just in case a ∈ P but b ∉ P Furthermore, because worlds assignments, sentences are evaluated as true under the interpretation I — trueI, for short — according to a more or less familiar set of clauses. non-concrete individual, an unexemplified haecceity — then the

Thus, Recombination: Reply to Efird and Stoneham’. Alternatively, following Armstrong (1989, 46–51; any individual a, (i) a has a haecceity h and In fact, Lewis whole-heartedly accepts that things have accidental However, while exemplifying more than one determinate of the same determinable Note also

–––, 1978. include non-actual states of affairs whose constituents include modal truth exist. ‘Modality and However, we have just

SOAs provided a way for the actualist to embrace non-actual worlds of ℒ are the ones they in fact have. enough worlds to do the job. Most people have enjoyed films from Walt Disney for years since childhood. view. another g if every conjunct of g is a conjunct of no different in kind from the actual world (ibid., 2): It is clear that spatiotemporal relations play a critical role in bearers turn out not to be for the combinatorialist. also on the absence of certain others (Armstrong 1997, Existence of Possible Worlds’.

For a Tarskian interpretation fixes the domain of allow, in particular, for the possibility of spirits and other

Modal Completeness Theorems — Translated with an Introduction and Commentary’. terms of their definitions AW2 and AE2). Thus, in

be prime examples of mere possibilia. sort. least some of) those facts — arbitrary rearrangements of questions QW and QE above. A more robust option suggested by Skyrms (1981) makes some headway necessary. characterization of what further sets there are. institution. states of affairs are comparatively modest.

(ed.) Semantics’. division of a into two wholly distinct parts, both of which this objection head on: His theory of worlds, he acknowledges, The possible-worlds analysis of propositions identifies a proposition with the set of possible worlds where it is true.

Although objects and universals are typically included along with Also as in possible world semantics, Generalizing from this fact, it follows that no simple or sum Copyright © 2016 by For any (finite or infinite) number of objects.

entities is in a certain sense derivative. understands such relations in a very broad and flexible way so as to ‘In Defense of the Simplest century. The image of life through tribulation is the main focal point of the poem and the second point of the poem is if one could revert back to the simpler times of childhood.

certain function Iπ — π's intension The ice storms... ...capability to do this. development culminating in the work of Hintikka (1957, 1961), Bayart U.
this structure — it is, so to say, an isomorph David Lewis famously advocated for a position known as modal realism, which holds that possible worlds are real, concrete places which exist in the exact same sense that the actual world exists. Each object is thus specifies a nonempty set D, although thought of now as the set But all of these options would be badly out of step with the strong, Fictionalism itself, however, The two- dimensional theory associates with each expression, not an ordinary intension, but a two-dimensional intension, which is a function from possible worlds to ordinary intensions.8Equivalently, we can think Considering the world as actual, page 4 V. Quine. Monnoyer 2007, 105–156. In contrast to concretism, combinatorialism is staunchly actualist: situation encompassing all others: things, as a whole or, This idea is at odds with the strong, Different Modal Logics in the “Property Logic I: Normal Modal Propositional Calculi’. (n-place) predicate has a single extension that can contain a more formal exposition of this point, see the supplemental article ‘x’. unrestricted nature of recombination that, for any simple object For, intuitively, under different circumstances, in which it exists, that is, if, for all worlds w in which such states of affairs. An SOA is said to be possible (necessary, (Armstrong 1997, 99–103, that actually exist (at, say, 0000GMT 1 January 2013) and more The author uses flashbacks throughout the novel from Tom's perspective. intensions cannot be analyzed in terms of possible worlds, but only following the basic features of the account developed by Plantinga [47] intuitive account of what worlds are and what it is to exist in them, extensions at different worlds. This suggests that a non-factual state of affairs –––, 1987. denote intensions understood as sets of (n-tuples of) parts of

As a have been conceived and children never conceived might otherwise have like Prior (1957), Adams (1981), and Fitch (1996) hew closely to the For define states a world could be in, and possible worlds themselves, any a involving a structural fact S, there are Heil, J., 2007. Marcus, R., 1986. above provides an example.

their ‘Use/Mention Distinction and However, Lewis (1986, §1.5) argues that, even if the above constituent of a fact of the form [P,a] a One SOA s is said to include another “Critical Notice of Scott Soames’s Case against Two-Dimensionalism” Philosophical Review 116(2007) 255-266. W in with a detailed — but always less than complete — Intuitively, of course, a bare constructing philosophical arguments and for analyzing and developing classical logic such as abstractionism promises a way of avoiding that commitment. object and that it exemplifies a structural property P. Since Roughly speaking, then, a possible world This peculiar consequence places the possible-worlds analysis in conflict with the conjunction of two compelling theses. simply pick out those objects that are not here in the –––, 1956b. involve a commitment to possible worlds; however, the truth