The investigation team began to discover that some federal regulators and MCCC employees knew beforehand that a coal slurry spill was possible.8, Following an earlier spill from the same Martin County reservoir in 1994, an MSHA engineer made nine recommendations to MCCC and MSHA regulators in a memorandum9 that was obtained by Salon through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.

Report on the October 2000 Breakthrough at the Big Branch Slurry Impoundment. Officials were still unsure as to what caused the spill, although one report suggest that a leak in one of the mine's walls may have weakened fortifications over time. © Union of Concerned Scientists

More voters than ever before will cast their ballots by mail this year. The spill polluted hundreds of miles (200–300 mi or 300–500 km) of the Big Sandy River and its tributaries and the Ohio River.

But Massey CEO Don Blankenship also announced during a conference call with investment bankers on July 31, 2003, that the company had just won a $21 million insurance settlement for property damage and business interruptions that resulted from the October 2000 slurry spill.

On Oct. 11, 2000, a coal sludge pond in Martin County, Ky. broke into an underground mine, releasing millions of gallons waste into Coldwater Fork and Wolf Creek. A blog on science, politics, and activism.

Contains current activity report to EPA on Kentuckey/West Virginia Coal Slurry Spill Martin County Coal Corporation Pollution, December 21, 2000. Climate change is one of the most devastating problems humanity has ever faced—and the clock is running out. The water that does come out of the pipes is foul-smelling and irritating to skin and eyes and is often contaminated with heavy metals and carcinogens. The memo indicated that MCCC should not be allowed to raise the level of the coal slurry reservoir without enacting the engineer’s recommendations.10, After the 2000 spill, MSHA’s engineering division head Mark Skiles wrote a memorandum (termed ‘the Skiles memo’) informing the spill investigation team that the local area MSHA office did not follow up on the 1994 recommended changes to the reservoir.11 According to Spadaro, MSHA district officials even allowed MCCC to increase the level of the reservoir by 80 feet12 after the 1994 incident without enforcing the needed changes.13 Based upon testimony from a consulting engineer, the investigation team also discovered that MCCC executives were aware of the continuing problems with the Martin County reservoir after the 1994 spill.14, The investigation team was in the process of collecting evidence that could have led to multiple serious citations against MCCC and its parent company, Massey Energy, when the incoming Bush administration cut the investigation short in early 2001.15 Incoming Bush administration officials replaced Tony Oppegard with Tim Thompson as the Martin County spill investigation team leader.16, Thompson told the team to finish interviewing and begin drafting the report.17 The number of interviews the team had left to conduct was pared down from approximately thirty or forty to six.18 Before the change in leadership, the team was planning on citing MCCC for eight federal violations, with three classified as “willful and negligent.”19 MCCC was cited for only two violations in the final report, one of which was later dropped.20 The final $55,000 fine MCCC paid to the federal government paled in comparison to the $3.25 million in penalties in damages that the coal company paid to the state of Kentucky.21, The new head of MSHA, David Lauriski, was a former mining executive and other top appointees were connected to the mining industry as well.22 According to Spadaro, pressure from Bush’s political appointees resulted in a watered down final accident investigation report.23 Spadaro and some members of the investigation team, interviewed by Salon on condition of anonymity, also believe that MSHA officials attempted to influence and change the Skiles memo.24 Spadaro refused to sign the final report, resigned from the investigation team in April 2001, and filed multiple complaints with the DOL’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) stating that the Bush administration officials had interfered with the accident investigation.25, In response to Spadaro’s complaint, the OIG issued a report in 2002 concluding that “none of the allegations brought forward by Mr. Spadaro were substantiated.”26 Spadaro maintains that the report’s conclusion is false.27 A copy of the OIG report was obtained by Ellen Smith, owner and editor of the newsletter Mine Safety and Health News, through a FOIA request.

The slurry, consisting of waste byproducts from coal processing, contained high levels of heavy metals, including mercury, lead, and arsenic, as well as other industrial pollutants. Cause Retaining wall instability .

U.S. Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao, wife of Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), oversaw the Mine Safety and Health Administration at the time.

Paul Patton formally declared a state of emergency, disaster was examined by the Environmental Protection Agency, at least 44 residents decided to seek damages, group of activists and local residents stood outside, SoCal Gas Has Permanently Stopped Leak in Gas Well Above Porter Ranch, State Confirms, Must Watch Docs: Five Thought-Provoking Energy Films For Summer, Is Climate Change "Not Debatable"? We're not talking brown water, we’re talking black, black lava just rolling.". The investigation found the impoundment had experienced a previous leak in 1994.

[3], Spadaro’s former boss at Mine Safety, Davitt McAteer, defended Spadaro, telling 60 Minutes that major coal sludge fatalities are avoided only "by the grace of God," and that officials expected a report that recommended violations, fines, and possible criminal charges. Site Martin County Coal Corp. The government charged that he had abused his authority, misused government credit cards and failed to follow procedures.45 He believes these charges were in retaliation for speaking out against political interference within MSHA.46 Spadaro denied the charges and filed a lawsuit against the government. By continuing, you accept our use of cookies.

United States Environmental Protection Agency, Kingston Fossil Plant coal fly ash slurry spill, "Sludge Spill Pollutes Ky., W. Va. Office of Surface Mining report.

Spadaro, J. UCS interview, February 12, 2009. The spill was 30 times larger than the Exxon Valdez oil spill (12 million US gallons (45,000 m3)) and one of the worst environmental disasters ever in the southeastern United States, according to the United States Environmental Protection Agency. BarbiAnn Maynard is a Martin County resident who has been fighting for the right to clean water since the 2000 disaster. You may need a …

Without verifying this, MSHA not only sanctioned the reopening of the facility; it greenlighted an increase in the volume of sludge. SourceWatch is a project of the Center for Media and Democracy (CMD). By morning, Wolf Creek was oozing with the black waste; on Coldwater Fork, a 10-foot-wide (3.0 m) stream became a 100-yard (91 m) expanse of thick slurry. Why did they charge the people—almost $100 extra a month for 10 years—instead of the mine owners?”. 33. ii.

December 9. This page was last edited on 25 December 2019, at 22:24. At first, Thompson only provided the signature page, and the four team members refused to sign without seeing the full report.

Demand the CDC continue collecting data on COVID-19 illness, hospitalizations, and deaths. 8. United States Department of Justice (DOJ) FOIA Post. Schools were closed, and both businesses and residents were encouraged to conserve what was left of safe drinking water. By morning, Wolf Creek was oozing with the black waste; on Coldwater Fork, a 10-foot (3.0 m) wide stream became a 100-yard (91 m) expanse of thick slurry. I use WIKI 2 every day and almost forgot how the original Wikipedia looks like.

After being re-instated to his original position within MSHA, as a result of an agreement outside of court between lawyers, he eventually resigned.47, Linc Chapman, a Martin County resident interviewed by Washington Monthly, stated in reference to Spadaro, “Normally, I don’t like federal mining investigators. New Attorney General FOIA Memorandum Issued. Sign up or text "SCIENCE" to 662266. Coal Country.

The polluting of Martin County’s water supply can be traced to the environmentally destructive practices such as mountaintop removal mining, which routinely pollute local ecosystems with waste and processing byproducts. Three ponds were constructed to hold collected sludge from the spill, and five more were planned.

A representative of the company told the press that officials would work “24 hours a day seven days a week” until matters were handled. The total volume of the spill was nearly 30 times greater than that of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, which dumped roughly 11 million gallons of crude oil off the coast of Alaska in 1989. Kentucky Gov. CBS News 60 Minutes, April 4. Martin County's torrent of sludge was more than 20 times the volume of the Exxon Valdez's crude oil spill in Alaska 11 years ago. After the 1994 leak, a MSHA official made a series of recommendations aimed at preventing another incident. In the wake of the Kingston Fossil Plant coal fly ash slurry spill, Appalshop provided a web stream of Sludge for a limited time.[17].

Congratulations on this excellent venture… what a great idea! -- Dennis Hatfield, president of Martin County Coal Corp. By morning, Wolf Creek was oozing with the black waste; on Coldwater Fork, a ten-foot (3 m) wide stream became a 100-yard (91 m) expanse of thick sludge. Kentucky Gov. They signed after making a few minor changes.36 One anonymous investigator stated that “I didn’t think it would be a good career move not to [sign].”37, Additionally, the OIG report discusses the “District Response” memo, a memo written by the district MSHA office in response to the Skiles memo’s allegations that the MSHA district office turned a blind eye to the MSHA engineer’s recommendations for the reservoir following the 1994 spill.38 The OIG report states that “the team members had concerns regarding the truthfulness... of the ‘District Response’ memo.”39 Both Spadaro and some members of the investigation team believe that the “District Response” memo was fictitious and back-dated to 2000.40 The OIG report only acknowledges the memo’s existence; the two pages following the initial description of the memo are redacted.41, Spadaro believes the investigation was suppressed for two main reasons. However, Massey largely dismissed the recommendations, and MSHA did nothing to compel it to improve the structural integrity of the impoundment.

In that memo an MSHA engineer made a series of nine critical recommendations that Martin County Coal and MSHA regulators needed to address before the company could resume using the impoundment after the 1994 "spill."